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PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY REDESIGNED: SPARKING A
DIALOGUE BETWEEN STUDENTS AND THE BAR

Lois R. Lupica•

I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, there have been many public and private, formal and in
formal complaints about the behavior of lawyers. 1 Moreover, lawyers'
tenuous reputation for honesty and integrity has been tarnished by recent,
well-publicized scandals.2 The public, as well as members of the bench and
bar, have further decried a decline in attorney professionalism. More than
once, it has been suggested that in some way, failings of law schools are to
blame. 3 In response to these observations about the professional behavior
of lawyers and as a result of my experiences of teaching a traditional, So
cratic-method Professional Responsibility class for many years, I decided to
focus concentrated efforts on redesigning my Professional Responsibility
course.
Since I began teaching, I have known that the traditional Professional
Responsibility course has a bad reputation. 4 Students' central and consis
tent complaint is that it is boring and unnecessary. They are in law school

* Professor of Law, University of Maine School of Law. B.S. Cornell University, 1981; J.D.
Boston University School of Law, 1987. Many thanks to Dean Colleen Khoury, David Nowlin, Deborah
Tuerkheimer, and Jennifer Wriggins for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this Article. I am indebted
to the Class of 1973/Glassman Faculty Research Fund for its generous research support.
I.
Lincoln Caplan, Commentary: lawyers' Standards in Free Fall: The Amoral Memo on Tor
ture ls Just One Example, L.A. TIMES, July 20, 2004, at B 13.
2.
Gary Young, 50 law Firms Subpoenaed in Enron Bankruptcy; Judge Grants Approval Despite
Objections, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 10, 2003, at A26; Terry Maxon, Lawyers to Rule on Ethics: Corporate
Scandals Have Led to Proposed Changes in Attorney-Client Code, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Aug. 9,
2003, at ID; Alan Goldstein & John Kirkpatrick, Law Firm's Reputation ls Under Fire: Jenkens &
Gilchrist Defends Its Conduct Amid IRS Inquiry, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, June 21, 2003, at ID.
3.
See Roger C. Cramton & Susan P. Koniak, Rule, Story and Commitment in the Teaching of
Legal Ethics, 38 WM. & MARYL. REv. 145 (1996); Linda Klebe Trevino, Moral Reasoning and Busi
ness Ethics: Implications for Research, Education and Management, 11 J. OF Bus. ETHICS 445 (1992)
(citing studies finding a correlation between moral education and moral behavior).
4.
I have taught Professional Responsibility since 1994. In my early years of teaching the course,
I would confidently tell my students on the first day, "This will be one of the most interesting and impor
tant classes you will take in law school." They invariably looked at me skeptically. but with the good
will that characterizes most of our students, they didn't (overtly) challenge this optimistic prediction. T
stopped including this statement in my introductory remarks after about four or five years of teaching the
course, because it became clear to me that my students did not think it was one of their most interesting
classes. Students grumbled about it, and on certain low days, the blasphemous thought crossed my mind
that some of my students would not have enrolled in my class but for the fact that it was a required
course.
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"to learn to practice law, not to learn this professional responsibility stuff."5
Students are not yet in proximity to the context in which the professional
responsibility issues arise, and often it is difficult for them to relate to the
conflicting tensions faced by the hypothetical lawyers; thus, they fail to see
the course's relevance. The fact is that the context of lawyering is too for
eign for students to have fully developed a moral sensitivity6 (which is the
foundation of moral decision-making) to the issues of professional respon
sibility.
Moreover, I began to wonder and question whether the Professional Re
sponsibility course, as traditionally understood, effectively does what it pro
fesses to do: that is, to teach students-so that they learn-about the duties
and responsibilities of members of the legal profession. 7 It is easy to recog
nize the right answer to a hypothetical question about whether there exists a
conflict of interest, but it is much harder to fully understand and effectively
reconcile the conflicting interests that are often at issue when presented in a
live practice setting. It is still harder to engage, without good training, in
high-level moral decision-making for the first time when the conflicting
pressures are real and immediate.
Furthermore, students have complained about not having the opportu
nity in law school to gain much information about the profession's practical
realities. Law students have few encounters with members of the bar, and
when they do, commonly in a job interview, an idealized conception of the
profession is communicated. Even upon entering law practice, economic
and competitive pressures are such that there is less time and attention paid
to young lawyers than has historically been the case. As such, newer law
yers do not have the necessary opportunities to develop the behaviors, adopt
5.
Composite comments gleaned from seven years of listening to informal feedback from Profes
sional Responsibility students.
6.
The moral decision-making process is comprised of four commonly understood elements: (i)
moral sensitivity (defined as "an awareness of the moral content in a situation"); (ii) moral judgment
(defined as "the selection of a standard of judgment, or framework of analysis, and its application to a
situation to identify morally appropriate action"); (iii) moral will (described as "the resolve to act in
conformity with the moral judgment"); and (iv) moral action (described as "the implementation of the
moral judgment"). Edward J. Conry & Donald R. Nelson, Business Law & Moral Growth, 27 AM. Bus.
L.J. I, 7-8 (1989).
7.
The final time I taught Professional Responsibility before its redesign, I was being reviewed for
tenure and promotion. With adrenaline coursing through my veins, I entered the class in which I was
being observed with creative hypotheticals, stimulating examples, and provocative questions. Notwith
standing the strong peer evaluation I received, in my mind, it was a typically disappointing and flat
discussion. It was after this class that I resolved to either stop teaching the course or reconfigure it in
some way. See Cramton & Koniak, supra note 3, at 154 ("[M]any law schools and the ABA tolerate
indifferent teaching of [legal ethics], maintaining the course requirements largely as a means of reassur
ing the public that the profession cares about ethics."). The ABA standards for law schools state:
The law school shall: require of all candidates for the first professional degree, instruction in
the duties and responsibilities of the legal profession. Such required instruction need not be
limited to any pedagogical method as long as the history, goals, structure and responsibilities
of the legal profession and its members, including the ABA Model Rules of Professional
Conduct, are all covered. Each law school is encouraged to involve members of the bench
and bar in such instruction.
ABA STANDARDS FOR THE APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS, Standard 302(a)(iv) (1995).
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the values, and model the practices of senior professionals. 8 Some have
looked to the law schools to connect the divide between the behaviors of
young lawyers and traditional conceptions of what it means to be a member
of the legal profession. 9
As I continued to teach the traditional lecture-size, Socratic-method
Professional Responsibility course, I found the students' lack of enthusiasm
and engagement in the class and with the material increasingly disturbing.
They rarely became animated about the ethical dilemmas facing the parties
in cases or agonized over the conflicting choices confronting the lawyers in
my hypotheticals. If students are not actively engaged in the resolution of
the professional ethical issues presented in law school, they will be unable
to draw effectively on a body of higher order learning when they are faced
with a non-hypothetical dilemma. Moreover, if all the information students
receive about the legal profession is from a casebook or from other second
hand sources, there is little opportunity to observe and internalize profes
sional behaviors and decision-making.
I challenged myself to somehow find a way to introduce the profes
sional responsibility curriculum to law students in a context that would ad
dress these issues. After much hard thinking about the problem and the
range of potential solutions, I decided to transform my Professional Respon
sibility course into a forum for a dialogue between the practicing bar, mem
bers of the bench, and law students on the subjects of law practice, legal
ethics, and professionalism. My vision was to create a course model
whereby, in each class, a member of the bar would be invited to participate
in a student-led discussion of a professional re'sponsibility issue. The guest
participant would be selected because of a demonstrated commitment to the
advancement of professional values as well as a specific expertise in the
topic or practice context of the day. I imagined a lively, collaborative, and
challenging discussion where students' cognitive and moral decision
making would be subject to challenges posed by classmates, the guest par
ticipant, as well as by me. My hope was that the course would be the be8.
This is sometimes apparent in the classroom behavior of students. For example, especially in
my early years as a teacher, many of my students evidenced a lack of respect for authority-or perhaps a
better way of putting it, a lack of understanding of the social codes of professional behavior. Examples
include the wearing of baseball caps in class, putting feet on the desk, disrespectful posture, and a gen
eral lack of attention to the class discussion. Early on in my teaching career, I spent a lot of time thinking
about why this was the case-as well as why many of my students behaved differently in my Property
class than they did in their other first-year classes. I identified a number of factors. First, I was the only
woman teaching in the first-year, and I was the only person teaching in the first-year in her early 30s.
Many oi the students were the firsl in their families to attend graduate school, and some, first to attend
college. A majority of the students were from Maine (and many from rural Maine), and many had never
lived anywhere else. In short, many students were never exposed to and did not know or understand the
codes of professional behavior.
9.
The basic thesis of the MacCrate report is that the "skills and values of the competent lawyer
are developed along a continuum that starts before law school, reaches its most formative and intensive
stage during the law school experience, and continues throughout a lawyer's professional career." ABA
SEC. OF LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, LEGAL EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL
DEVELOPMENT-AN EDUCATIONAL CONTINUUM, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON LAW SCHOOLS AND
THE PROFESSION: NARROWING THE GAP 3 (1992) [hereinafter MACCRATE REPORT].
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ginning of a conversation about professional ethical issues that was so inter
esting, engaging, and inspiring that the students would be motivated to con
tinue it throughout their careers.
II. THE COURSE OBJECTIVES

I was determined to design a course in which compelling professional
responsibility issues would be situated in the contexts in which they would
inevitably arise. It was my thought that the students would be better able to
engage with the material if they had a better understanding of the realities of
law practice. The presentation of firsthand stories of lawyer satisfaction, as
well as dissatisfaction, would enable the students to examine the range of
professional options within (and outside of) the profession. In this way,
students would be presented with a more nuanced and richer perspective on
the legal profession than they could glean from text.
I further wanted to establish a context in which students would begin a
conversation about the process of ethical decision-making implicated in a
variety of practice settings by a variety of types of lawyers. As has been
observed, "[p]rofessional diversity stems from at least three important
sources: the nature of the professional work itself, the diversity of the peo
ple engaged in practice, and the contextualized nature of ethical decision
making." 10 The historical conception of the profession has changed largely
as a result of the changes in the composition of its members. Formerly ho
mogenous, in terms of gender, financial means, culture, race, ethnicity, and
class, the bar has changed. 11 The culture has changed, and many barriers to
entry have been lowered. Greater diversity in the bar has meant that "un
spoken codes of conduct" can no longer be relied upon. Conversations in
law school need to include a discussion of the extent to which these societal
and cultural changes have impacted traditional notions of what it has meant
to be a "professional." I wanted students to discover their reaction to the
bench and bar's perception of the recent decline of attorney professional
ism-and to begin that conversation with the discussion of what is meant by
the term "professionalism."
I also endeavored to address and incorporate more issues in the course
than are generally included in the traditional professional responsibility cur
riculum. I wanted students to have an opportunity to learn about the many
aspects of their future profession and to understand the variety of legal work
that is available to them. I found that law students are, for the most part,
unaware of the array of practice contexts that exist. I could not present,
firsthand, multiple examples of the professional diversity that exists among
lawyers (my firsthand familiarity with the practice of law is in one particuI0.
"This means that each ethical question is, in important ways, distinct from every other one
because of its unique context." Eleanor W. Myers, "'Simple Truths" About Moral Education, 45 AM. U.
L. REV. 823. 841 (1996).
11.
See MACCRATE REPORT, supra note 9, at 13-27.
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Jar context). 12 My thought was that conversations with a diverse selection
of attorneys, whose specialties cover the spectrum of law practice, would
allow students to consider a wide range of professional identities. The more
professional options an aspiring attorney is aware of, the more likely it is
that she will take actions and make choices consistent with her values and
temperament. My theory is that the more contented one is, the less likely
one is to compromise one's personal integrity. 13
I further undertook the challenge of introducing the students to an ana
lytical framework for moral decision-making. 14 This framework was de
signed to both increase their sensitivity to ethical issues and to serve as a
tool for facilitating the exercise of moral judgment. 15 I endeavored to offer
them a hierarchy of standards of moral action, drawing, in part, on the work
of psychologist Lawrence Kohlberg. 16 Kohlberg advanced what has been
called the "stage theory of moral development." 17 According to Kohlberg's
teachings, human beings evolve through as many as six stages of moral de
velopment.18 While it was once thought that humans reached their final
stage of moral development in childhood, recent studies have shown they
can continue this developmental evolution into adulthood. 19 I drew on this
research to stimulate students' sensitivity to the kinds of ethical issues that

12.
Prior to my teaching career, I practiced law at two different firms, both in New York City. One
was a large, international, corporate firm headquartered in New York, with offices all over the world. In
my office, there were hundreds of lawyers and dozens of practice groups. My second job was with the
newly opened New York office of a large Washington, D.C.-based firm. I was the eighth lawyer to join
the office. As a young associate, I had the opportunity to participate in the development of the office by
working closely with partners. I was fortunate to have worked with many intelligent and ethical indi
viduals. I also had the opportunity to observe some faults in the structures of my law firms. Notwith
standing the rich substantive practice experience I bring to my commercial law classes, I can only bring
one practice context to my Professional Responsibility class.
13.
Myers, supra note 10, at 848.
Imparting a richer sense of the range of practice may ... contribute to student~' ability to
construct alternative visions of lawyering so that if they find themselves in a practice that is
inhospitable to the values that they hold, they will have the confidence to challenge it. Culti
vating an understanding that there is no single conception of professional lawyering may as
sist our students both to seek and to create alternative visions of practice.
Id.
14.
Conry & Nelson, supra note 6, at 7 (describing a framework for moral decision-making in the
business school context).
15.
Id.
16.
LAWRENCE KOHLBERG ET AL., MORAL STAGES: A CURRENT FORMULATION AND A RESPONSE
TO CRITICS (John A. Meacham ed., 1983).
17.
These levels were identified as (i) obedience (actions are moral when they are taken in confor
mity with rules and in avoidance of punishment), (ii) instrumental egoism and simple exchange (actions
are moral when they are laken in cunformity with rules and in furd1er::mce of the actor's self interest),
(iii) interpersonal concordance (actions are moral if they result in approval from others), (iv) law & duty
to the social order (actions are moral if they avoid chaos and uphold law and order), (v) social consensus
(actions are moral if they are in conformity with rules that respect both the majority and the minority),
(vi) non-arbitrary social cooperation (actions are moral if they are in conformity with the choices "impar
tial, rational and equal persons would identify as the appropriate standards under which social life should
proceed"). Id. A feminist critique of Kolhberg's work can be found in CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A
DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT ( 1993).
18.
KOHLBERG ET AL., supra note 16.
Id.
19.
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arise in the practice of law and explore the resolution of these issues through
the lens of each stage of moral development.
The fundamental objective of my course redesign was to create a peda
gogical model where students would learn to engage in a higher level of
critical reflection, a place where they could begin their hard thinking about
the moral ambiguities attendant to the practice of law, and discover for
themselves that the profession is not designed to resolve these ambigui
ties-but that it exists because of them. 20 I wanted the course to be the be
ginning of students' examination and thoughtful consideration of profes
sional ethical issues, with the prospect of thinking out loud about the moral
judgments they will have to make once they are in practice-at a rare time
in their career when they have no vested economic interest in the outcome. 21
III. DESCRIPTION OF THE PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY COURSE DESIGN

A. Class Format
The discussion-based format of the course redesign meant that I had to
limit enrollment to the number of students that fit around a seminar table
(16 students). 22 The class met twice a week for 75 minutes each class. I
created a course website, using the "Blackboard" technology, 23 as a way of
communicating assignments, supplemental readings, and links to cases and
ethics opinions. In addition, the Blackboard provided a further forum to
discuss and, at times, debrief issues raised in previous classes. It provided
me, as well as the students, the additional opportunity to comment on previ
ous classes and make the connection between various topics and conversa
tional themes.
B. The Readings

There are many fine Professional Responsibility texts, 24 but the ones I
had used in the past did not suit my new seminar discussion format. I
20.
Timothy P. Terrell & James H. Wildman, Rethinking Professionalism, 41 EMORY L.J. 403, 407
(1992).
21.
Deborah Rhode, If Integrity Is the Answer, What Is the Question?, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 333,
342 (2003) ("[T]here is some value in having students confront the tradeoffs before they have a vested
economic interest in the resolution.").
22.
Clearly, offering a required course and limiting it to 16 students raises institutional resource
issues. This past academic year, I taught two sections of Professional Responsibility, with another
professor offering an unlimited enrollment section during the spring semester. The prior year, I similarly
taught two sections. Typically, if enrollment is not capped, my Professional Responsibility course
attracts a class between 35 and 60 students. Following my first offering of this class in its redesigned
format, the waiting list was as high as sixty students.
23.
Blackboard is supported by Lexis/Nexis. Westlaw offers a similar tool for professors interested
in creating user-friendly course websites.
24.
I have used two such texts over the past eight years of teaching the course: STEPHEN GILLERS,
REGULATION OF LAWYERS: PROBLEMS OF LAW AND ETHICS (4th ed. 1995), and GEOFFREYC. HAZARD,
JR., SUSAN P. KONtAK, &ROGER C. CRAMTON, THE LAW AND ETHICS OF LAWYERING (3d ed. 1999).
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needed teaching materials in which topics were presented in a hypothetical
(yet realistic) context, with sufficiently interesting supporting readings to
enrich a 75 minute discussion. The text I selected was Legal Ethics in the
Practice of !Aw, by Carol Langford and Richard Zitrin. 25 This casebook is
organized as a series of 30 problems, each of which is designed to be cov
ered in one class period. Each problem addresses a topic in depth, and I
have found, with few exceptions, 26 that the problems sketch reasonably real
istic scenarios. The readings that accompany each problem include judicial
opinions, law review article excerpts, excerpts from the popular press, ethics
opinions, as well as observations made and questions posed by the casebook
authors. The readings provide sufficient information so that students are
able to understand a wide range of issues that are implicated by each topic.
More than once, students and guests noted that the casebook authors pre
sented a distinct "point of view." The authors' position with respect to
many issues was obvious to the reader, but since one of my central objec
tives for the class was to elicit an enthusiastic discussion, the perspective
offered, if not always agreed with, served its purpose.
I also assigned the Model Rules of Professional Responsibility (the
Rules). They served as the governing rules in "our jurisdiction."27 Being
prepared for the discussion meant reading and understanding the relevant
Rule or Rules. While often a Rule does not provide the "answer" to a prob
lem implicating conflicting interests, the deliberative consideration of the
range of analytical tools available to resolve a problem requires an under
standing of the Rules and their underlying purpose.2 8

25.
The casebook comprehensively covers all of the traditional topics in a professional responsibil
ity class. These topics include the following: What duty of competency attorneys owe clients; what
responsibility lawyers have to take all cases that come through the door; the formation of the attorney
client relationship' attorney fee options; the duty of confidentiality and the attorney-client privilege;
loyalties and conflicts of interest; the representation of entities; attorney self-interest; ethical dilemmas in
the insurance defense practice context; ethical dilemmas in the criminal defense practice context; the
duty of advocacy; clients and perjury; trial "tactics"; ethical dilemmas faced by prosecutors; ethical
dilemmas faced by lawyers as counselor; attorney advertising; and legal services for the indigent. In
addition, the Langford & Zitrin casebook includes newly important topics such as the effect of commu
nication technologies on the duty of confidentiality, the impact of diversity on the legal profession, and
questions about law firm pressures.
26.
From time-to-time, a guest participant would challenge the way the hypothetical presented an
issue. When this happened, excellent class discussions invariably ensued. The guest would then pro
ceed to sketch how the issue would "really" arise, and his redesigned hypothetical formed the basis for
the class discussion. The guest was able to explain why the situation would not arise in the way de
scribed in the book, offering lhe students detailed insights into the guest's practice.

27.
The vast majority of the invited guests were licensed to practice law in the State of Maine and
governed by the Maine Bar Rules (which are not based on the Model Rules of Professional Responsibil
ity, but are a hybrid). I provided an electronic link to the Maine Bar Rules on Blackboard, in the event
the invited guest referenced them. From time-to-time, we discussed as a class the significance of distinc
tion in the substance, or more often the language, of the Maine Rule, as compared to the comparable
Model Rule.
28.
See Cramton & Koniak, supra note 3, at 159 ("Understanding [the Rules governing attorney
behavior] is a prerequisite to the moral reasoning and moral choice that flow from legal rules that confer
discretion upon the lawyer.").
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C. Student-Led Discussions and Evaluation
Central to the success of my redesigned course was active student par
ticipation and engagement. I decided to address this issue head-on by mak
ing class participation fifty percent of the students' final grade; with this
motivation offered, there was universal participation. In addition, I assigned
two students per class to lead the class discussion. These students were
responsible for designing an approach to the material's presentation, and the
burden was shifted to them to elicit peer participation.
Student effectiveness and creativity varied. Some student discussion
leaders had the class play the role of law firm partners charged with the
responsibility of setting firm policy on a particular issue, i.e., under what
circumstances to decline, take, or withdraw from a case; when to ask a cli
ent to waive a conflict of interest; whether attorneys who work reduced
hours be eligible for partnership; what to do when you suspect another law
yer of substance abuse; and whether the firm should launch a television
advertising campaign. Other discussion leaders framed the issue of the day
as a question for debate and assigned half the class to prepare and argue one
position and half the other. Yet other classes put students in the roles of
client and attorney and role-played an encounter.
This level of active participation on the part of the students, coupled
with regular responsibility for designing the class and leading the discus
sion, forced the students to engage the material with an intensity I had never
before seen. 29 The intensity was contagious. With every class, the discus
sion rose to an increasingly more sophisticated level. Consistent with the
studies that conclude that moral reasoning can be influenced by exposure to
and participation in the analysis of ethical dilemmas, 30 I observed that the
greater frequency with which I introduced higher level analytical reasoning,
the more sophisticated the discussion became. As I regularly presented an
analysis of the problem using more advanced stages of moral reasoning, the
more students naturally invoked higher levels to frame their analysis of the
.
31
issue.
29.
There are certain risks associated with this approach. When you abdicate responsibility for the
presentation of material (even if you selected the material and invited and briefed the guest), the class
can, at times, take some interesting turns. For example, in one class, instead of a student beginning the
discussion with the text's well-crafted, carefully construed hypothetical, the discussion leaders wrote a
similar, albeit flawed, hypothetical and used it to frame the initial discussion. We spent the first portion
of the class adding facts and circumstances to the hypothetical to elicit a richer discussion of the issues.
In another class, the guest participant made a statement about a practice in her firm that impli
cated conflict of interest as well as confidentiality issues. While the statement was true in the context in
which she was referring and in her jurisdiction, other jurisdictions had engaged in a more nuanced analy
sis of this issue. The way the statement was presented, it would have been awkward to point out the
misleading impression that was left. That evening, I posted an article that comprehensively laid the
issues out in a methodical way, and gave full recognition to the majority and minority positions. I then
directed students to the article so that they would gain a fuller understanding of this issue.
30.
Trevino, supra note 3, at 454.
Id. ("[T]he most effective educational programs are those that involve dilemma discussions and
31.
those that last from four to twelve weeks.").
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As mentioned above, fifty percent of the students' final grade was based
upon class participation. The balance of their grade was based upon their
performance on a five-day take-home exam. The students were given an
article excerpt, presenting one perspective on an issue or aspect of the legal
profession. They were asked to write an eight-to-ten page essay, drawing
upon the information and analytical frameworks discussed throughout the
semester. I was specifically looking for the students' evolution through the
stages of moral reasoning. After reading three semesters of these essays, I
can say with confidence that the quality of analysis and moral reasoning
was considerably higher than was the case among my students who took my
traditional, Socratic-method Professional Responsibility class. The essays
were richer in detail and considerably more reflective. They consistently
demonstrated a higher level of moral sensitivity as well as greater facility
with the range of analytical frameworks available for analysis. In short,
their essays reflected a higher understanding of the ethical issues that arise
in the practice of law and the competing arguments and analysis involved in
their resolution.

D. The "Guest Participant"
The key to creating as realistic a context as possible for the discussion
of hypothetical ethical dilemmas was the participation of a practicing attor
ney with specific experience in the context or topic. 32 The guests were not
expected to provide lectures or formal presentations, but to generally par
ticipate in the class discussion and to comment on the extent to which the
issue Eresented in the hypothetical would arise in the way described in the
book. 3 I provided the class assignment to the guest participant several
weeks in advance so they would be familiar with the material the students
were presenting and discussing. In some instances, the guests would offer
further variations of the hypothetical from their own experience.
Having a guest attorney participate in each class discussion offered
many benefits. First, it introduced a different, more formalized dynamic to
32.
In a few cases, I invited a judge or judges, depending upon the topic. For example, in one class,
I had a judicial officer participate in the discussion on attorney sanctions. In another class, I had two
trial court judges participate in a discussion of the ethical issues that arise in the course of discovery. I
extended invitations to other state and federal judges, but scheduling constraints precluded their partici
pation.
If the hypothetical was somewhat off the mark, the guest often would describe how the issue
33.
might more realisiically arise. For example, when the topic of the day was the "attorney as counselor,"
the hypothetical problem involved an immigration lawyer counseling a United States ciiizen who was
considering the marriage to a much younger citizen of another country. Our guest participant was a legal
aid immigration lawyer. She explained to the students that the situation would never arise in the way
described in the book. She then continued to describe the kind of encounters she had with prospective
clients on a regular basis--encounters that raised similar issues of integrity. She further explained how
the indicia of residency and permanency required by the federal immigration authorities mostly included
things that were unavailable to very low-income immigrants (such as phone bills, joint bank accounts,
and other jointly owned property). In this way, she gave the students a greater sense of the context in
which many of these issues are situated.
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the class. For the most part, students behaved as if we had "company," and
were more prepared and engaged than I suspect they would otherwise have
been. 34 Second, the guest offered not only an additional perspective on the
readings and hypotheticals, but also added the benefit of her experience in
the context or practice area in which the issue of the day arose. The guests
were able to not only discuss the issue presented by the readings but also,
from their experience, situate the issue in a realistic practice context.35 In
this way, the formal Professional Responsibility course was used to assimi
late and re-examine the substantive content from other classes in the law
school curriculum. In addition to the substantive context, guest participants
also provided students with textured insights into their law practice worlds,
often offering descriptions of their organizational dynamics, pressures, and
tensions.3 6
A further objective of the course design was to provide students with a
proxy for the often elusive mentor. The pressures of current-day law prac
tice means that the mentoring of new lawyers may be compromised. Newer
lawyers have fewer opportunities to learn the habits, behaviors, and prac
tices expected of professionals. My thought was that the law school could
make a connection between soon-to-be lawyers and practicing lawyers so
that traditional conceptions about what it means to be a member of the legal
profession could be relayed. 37 Most of the guests offered to continue the
34.
The high level of preparation and engagement could be attributed, in part, to the evaluation
structure-50% of the students' final grade was based upon class participation. While I am sure the
grading structure was an influencing factor, I suspect that kind of long-term motivation is difficult to
sustain over a fourteen-week semester. When a new and different guest was present in each class, there
was a fresh tension, which in my observation, led to a high level of attentiveness.
35.
In light of the recent corporate scandals, we spent quite a few classes on the issues that are
raised in the course of representation of entity clients. These issues include the fundamental questions
of: Who is your client? Where do your loyalties lie? How do you reconcile the inevitable conflicting
interests that will present themselves? A former in-house general counsel of a Fortune 500 company
joined one of these discussions as a guest participant. He helped situate the general counsel within the
framework of a corporate structure. He explained the special responsibility of a counselor and offered
the students concrete examples of some of the difficult choices that corporate counsel face. The student
discussion leaders presented hypotheticals to the class, and our guest participated in the critique of stu
dents as they engaged in an analysis of the issues. Our guest then offered variations on the student
hypotheticals but added an additional dose of realism by forcing students to grapple with the economic
tensions faced by a board of directors, corporate managers, and in-house counsel. In this way, he added
further shades of gray to the continuum of choices confronted by lawyers in a position when they were
forced to reconcile conflicting interests.
"Realistic detail must guide the discussion of what a lawyer should do. Without it, the ethics
36.
lessons are useless. Teaching legal ethics thus requires teaching a rich body of particulars about law
yers' work." Crarnton & Koniak, supra note 3, at 172.
37.
For example, when the subject of the class was attorney competency-What level of compe
tency does a lawyer owe her client before she takes a particular case?-! invited a relatively recent
graduate who had joined a very small general practice firm in rural Maine upon her graduation. This
attorney explained how she "learned" to practice law by shadowing her mentor, and what steps she took
to gain competency. She was very forthcoming about what worked, what did not work so well, and how
she continues to struggle with this question of competency. The students in the class, many of whom
planned to practice in a similar context, asked questions of the guest along the lines of, "How do you
translate taking a survey course in bankruptcy to being able to prepare and file a bankruptcy petition for
a consumer?" "How do you fulfill your responsibility to your client when you don't know anything?"
"Under what circumstances would you decline to take a particular matter and case?" "To what extent
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conversations outside of class. By engaging members of the bar in the edu
cational experience, both parties would reap benefits that I hoped would
persist beyond the class period. 38
Finally, I wanted to use the Professional Responsibility course as an op
portunity to trigger a conversation about professional ethics among mem
bers of the bench and bar. Notwithstanding the requirement in many states
of continuing education on the subject, legal ethics is not a topic that many
practicing lawyers spend a lot of time thinking about or talking about in any
formalized way. I wanted to create an opportunity for a dialogue and an
exchange of ideas between students (with their idealism) and practitioners
(with their practicality, grown out of experience). I also wanted to create a
"buzz" among members of the bar on the subject of legal ethics. 39 I hoped
to offer my students an opportunity to learn about ethics and the practice of
law from successful, experienced members of the bar, 40 and to offer practi
tioners an opportunity for a more meaningful "continuing ethical education"
than they receive through continuing legal education programs.
IV. THE PERSISTENT THEME: "PROFESSIONALISM"

A theme that has been haunting both the legal profession and my Pro
fessional Responsibility course is the public cry of the "decline of attorney
professionalism." This issue is regularly the topic at conferences,41 is the
subject of scores of articles, 42 and is even the focus of a number of cornrnis
does the need to attract and retain clients influence the decision as to whether to handle a matter for the
first time?" The guest described how she closed the gap between law school theory and practice and
generously offered a number of specific examples. She also described what her practice context in
volved and the pros and cons of her choices.
In another semester, I invited a third-year attorney who was practicing with a sixty-person firm
in the State capitol to discuss the same topic. She was experiencing a very different training model in a
very different context. She had clerked for a state court judge and was one of many associates at her
new finn. She had not yet had many opportunities for independent client representation, but the issues
she was addressing in her legislative and health-care practice were considerably more complex. The
students posed similar questions of her in their effort to define the contours of how she translated her law
school-gained knowledge into competent legal representation.
38.
Some students made appointments to later meet with the guest participant for "information
interviews." In a number of instances, professional mentoring relationships developed, and in a few
cases, students ended up with job offers.
39.
The Maine Bar is relatively small and news tends to spread quickly. It was clear, after a few
weeks, that word of my course had "hit the streets." Lawyers I had not yet asked to participate were
volunteering. Regularly, at the end of class, I heard from the guest how interesting and refreshing the
discussion was and how it had "been a while" since they ''thought about these issues." Indeed, over the
course of three semesters, I had over sixty lawyers and judges participate in the course. The only reason
my invitation to participate in die class \Vas declined \Vas due to schedu!ing constraints (er at least, tl-iat is
what they told me). Pursuant to the Maine Bar Rules, lawyers are eligible to earn 1.25 Continuing Legal
Education credits for their participation.
40.
I invited practicing lawyers with a range of practice experience-from two to thirty years.
41.
See, e.g., 2003 Conference on Ethics and Professionalism, Emory University School of Law;
Professionalism and the Law: From Territorial Days to the Millennium, Washburn Law School, Univer
sity of Kansas, 1998; Burge Professionalism Conference 2005, Georgia State University Law School.
42.
Mark R. Killenbeck, Professionalism in the Balance, 49 ARK. L. REV. 671 (1997); Ronald D.
Rotunda, Professionalism, legal Advertising, and Free Speech in the Wake of Florida Bar v. Went For
It, Inc., 49 ARK. L REV. 703 (1997); Thomas D. Morgan, Real World Pressures on Professionalism, 23
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sions and centers.43 I hold to the idea, however, that professionalism cannot
be "taught." Professionalism is a set of values that must be individually
developed. In thinking about how I could provide a forum for the students'
development of their conception of professionalism, I cautioned myself
against defining professionalism as a synonym of civility. Civility is cer
tainly important, but undergirding a civil demeanor must be a respect for the
system and the rule of law as well as for other players in each attorney's
professional constellation.44
I balked at having the identification of professionalism turn on the an
swer to the question, "Is law a profession or a business?" I do not see the
two as mutually exclusive in light of the ability of many lawyers to honor
the values of excellence, integrity, respect, and accountability while still
operating their law practices as successful businesses. Recognizing that my
students come from an assortment of backgrounds and present a variety of
experiences, I resisted hitting them over the head with lessons in decorum.
In a more homogenous society, social and cultural codes and mores are
clear, and most of these are taught (and learned) at an early age. When a
student's first exposure to a learned profession is in graduate school, the
most effective means of communicating the unifying values of the profes
sion is not through a lecture but through the presentation of exemplars of
positive professional behavior and principles.
Above all, I wanted to avoid preaching on my part and cynicism on
theirs. I wanted to introduce a healthy appreciation of the complexity and
ambiguity of the lawyer's role in and relationship with society. I wanted
students to not only be aware of the timeless values that have served the
legal professionals but also of tools that are available to them to analyze
ethical dilemmas in light of these values. I wanted them to recognize the
value of their reputation for integrity and how easily it could be lost. Fi
nally, I wanted them to have the opportunity and methodology to critically
analyze the traditional conception of professionalism, in light of the diver
sity that currently exists among members of the legal profession.
Of the substantial body of scholarship on the subject of professional re
sponsibility, the essay Rethinking "Professionalism," by Timothy Terrell
and James H. Wildman, had the greatest impact on the development of my

U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 409 (2001); Judith Welch Wegner, Fifty-Ninth Cleveland-Marshall Fund
Lecture: Lawyers, Leaming, and Professionalism: Meditations on a Theme, 43 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 191
( 1995); Beverly Balos, The Bounds of Professionalism: Challenging Our Students, Challenging Our
selves, 4 CLINICAL L. REV. 129 (1997); N. Lee Cooper & Stephen Humphreys, Beyond The Rules:
lawyer Image and the Scope of Professionalism, 26 CUMB. L. REV. 923 (1995/96).
43.
See, e.g., Nelson, Mullins, Riley & Scarborough Center on Professionalism at the University of
South Carolina School of Law; ABA Standing Committee on Professionalism.
44.
It may be the case that in the pursuit of the conflicting virtues of, for example, accountability to
client interests and respect for members of the profession, compromise may result in a concession of a
measure of civility. Such a resolution of conflicting virtues is never easy to arrive at-but these are the
kind of conflicts about whose full measure of complexity is impossible to see and internalize without the
benefit of rich, detailed context.
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thinking about attorney professionalism. 45 In referring to the issue of erod
ing attorney professionalism, the authors observe, "lawyers have sought a
cure for a disease before agreeing on its nature, symptoms, and causes.',46
In deftly identifying the divergent perspectives on the issue of attorney pro
fessionalism and citing the work of political theorist Jaroslav Pelikan, the
authors draw a distinction between "tradition" and "traditionalism" in the
legal profession. 47 Identifying traditionalism as a "superficial and simplis
tic appreciation of one's heritage that provides no meaningful sense of per
spective and judgment," they advise that "references to 'professionalism'
may be nothing more than a sentimental form of 'traditionalism,' a call for
more civility and public respect simply because this is our impression of a
happier past.',48 In cautioning against both trivializing and politicizing the
issue, the authors posit that professionalism involves more than exhibiting a
positive bedside manner and providing pro bono legal services. 49 They ar
gue that the professional tradition of lawyering is defined by a "set of essen
tial, timeless principles that impose important restraints and create special
expectations separating the attorney from others."50 They identified these
principles as (a) an ethic of excellence, 51 (b) an ethic of integrity,52 (c) a

45.
46.

Terrell & Wildman, supra note 20, at 403.

Id.
Id. at 405--06.
48.
Id. "It is a reverence for the past for its own sake-a nostalgia for the 'good old days.' It is
empty of moral content, and therefore sadly pretentious." Id. at 405 (citing JAROSLAV J. PELIKAN, THE
VINDICATION OF TRADITION 65 (1984)).
49.
Terrell & Wildman, supra note 20, at 419--22. One "trivializes" professionalism by defining it

47.

exclusively as the lawyer's bedside manner and "politicizes" it by defining it solely as an obligation to
provide legal services for indigent clients. Id.
50.
Id. at 406.
51.
Unfortunately, the law school education model does not provide a good template for students'
future practice lives. As research institutions, the law school model is designed to deliver education as
efficiently as possible in a setting of scarce resources. Large classes, no research assistants, one final
exam, and very little feedback or accountability allows students to potentially do very well on exams
without a steady and sustained effort. In contrast, few lawyers can manage a caseload and serve their
clients well patterning their work style after that adopted in law school. One of the responsibilities a law
school has is communicating the extent to which law practice is hard work, both in terms of pressure and
substance; lawyers have responsibility for people's lives, families, businesses, and money. Making a
mistake or neglecting a matter can have far-reaching consequences. While it might work in law school,
being barely prepared in practice is not good enough. I could think of no better way to impart and rein
force the value of excellence than through the modeling provided by our guest participants. I endeav
ored to invite very good lawyers, lawyers who work hard and strive for the standard of excellence.
Regular and consistent descriptions, over a fourteen-week period, of how these lawyers met the demands
of practice made an impression. The difficulty of balancing L'1e pressure of !aw practice with other obli
gations and interests (such as personal relationships; family, civic, and charitable duties; and cultural and
athletic interests) became a consistent topic of conversation.
52.
It is easy to demonstrate integrity when nothing is at stake. One of my frustrations with teach
ing professional responsibility in the traditional format is that when matters of integrity arose, the stu
dents always said the "right" answer. They would always quit their job, withdraw from representation,
and blow the whistle on lawyers engaging in rule-breaking behavior. They saw the questions as easy
and always knew the correct answer. At the crux of the ethic of integrity is the judgment and strength to
say no when it is not easy to say no--when something real and important is at stake; when you are at
risk of losing a case, a client, a job, or a friend.
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respect for the system and rule of law,53 (d) a respect for other lawyers and
their work,54 (e) a commitment to accountability,55 and (f) a responsibility
for adequate distribution of legal services. 56 I endeavored to introduce these
principles for discussion and debate and frame each topic to include an ex
ploration of some or all of these values.
I determined that the most effective way to communicate these values
was through the stories and, in many instances, the modeling provided by
the guest participants. It was not a difficult task to pose questions or issues
that examined the guests' conceptions of what it means to be a member of a
profession. The students had the opportunity to compare and contrast no
tions held by lawyers engaged in different practice models, and observe and
learn from lawyers of different ethnicities, genders, class, and generations.
While the common thread among the lawyers' and judges' perceptions was
a focus on excellence, integrity, accountability, and respect, there was a
great deal of variation in how these values played out in practice. Conver
sations in class led students to examine and then define the contours of their
own conception of professionalism.
For example, one of the most interesting and provocative discussions
centered on the topic of attorney advertising. The guest was a law firm
partner specializing in personal injury law. His firm had launched an ag
gressive television advertising campaign designed to communicate a hard
hitting style of practice. As a result of his commercials, his firm was a
household name. The students entered class with a preconceived negative
impression of this firm and its decision to advertise in the way it did.
After the student discussion leaders introduced the topic and outlined
the litany of state and federal cases defining the permissible limits of attor
ney advertising, they asked the guest to explain his firm's reasons for en
gaging in what they characterized as a practice that further tarnished the

53.
A "direct extension of the ethic of integrity" is a respect for the system of law as a framework
for resolving disputes and structuring relationships. If lawyers actively demonstrate respect for the legal
system, the public perception will follow. Terrell & Wildman, supra note 20, at 426.
54.
Id. at 427.
[C]ivility within the profession is not entirely a trivial matter. It does in fact have its place
among our basic professional values. This is not because of the historic background of the
Bar as a "gentlemen's club" in which etiquette would be expected, and it is not because a law
degree in and of itself entitles anyone to special deference. Instead. civility should follow
from the recognition of the lawyer's social function, not his or her social status ....
. . . [C]ivility must be understood in its relation to several other principles, including quite
fundamentally the lawyer's responsibility to his or her clients and their rights.
Id.
Id. at 428.
55.
"[C]lients (and by extension, society as a whole) are entitled to understand the services that
the lawyer renders, and moreover to have the sense that the fees charged for those services
are fair. This accountability is the cornerstone of the professional independence lawyers en
joy ....
Full accountability is closely related ... to the ethic of excellence in our professional ser
vices."
Id.
56.
Terrell & Wildman, supra note 20, at 428.
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public's perception of lawyers. The guest noted that he was not surprised at
the negative reaction the students had to his firm's ads, because the students
were not the ads' target audience; they likely did not need the information
that the ads provided because they had other means of finding ways to ad
dress their (potential) future harms. The market for his firm's services, how
ever, was, for the most part, less sophisticated and less likely to have the
information provided by the ads. Members of corporate firms endeavor,
through personal contacts, public appearances, and other discrete means, to
deliver information about their firm to their market of businesses and well
off individuals. The guest's firm was doing the same thing but targeted,
both in style and method, at his practice area's market. The advertisements
may not have been to the taste of all, but because his practice was designed
to address power and resource imbalances following a harm, in his view,
advertising was the most effective means to this end. While not all students
were persuaded by his reasoning, the class concluded the conversation by
observing that its initial analysis of the role of attorney advertising, gained
from the reading of cases and commentary, was, at best, two dimensional
and incomplete-and that an attorney's decision to engage in an advertising
campaign did not a fortiori suggest a compromise of the values of profes
sionalism.
V. MORAL DECISION-MAKING-THE PEDAGOGICAL METHODOLOGY

The seed for the model of this class grew out of instinct and experience,
but I thought it would be useful to augment my knowledge base with re
search in moral education theory. My thesis that students learn and retain
information best in a context of active learning and engagement has been
long confirmed by education theorists and empiricists. 57 I further found that
when students are actively engaged in the learning process, they develop
higher level cognitive58 and moral decision-making strategies. 59 Adult
learners have the ability to progress sequentially through stages of moral
decision-making, and the degree of their progress can be improved through
education.60 Students who are more exposed to advanced-stage moral deci
sion-making than that which they generally engage in experience a restruc
turing of their cognitive patterns.61 Upon such exposure, they experience an
"internal cognitive conflict," leading them to question their own reasoning

57.
DAVID W. JOHNSON & ROGER T. JOHNSON, LEARNING TOGETHER AND ALONE: COOPERATIVE,
COMPETITIVE AND INDIVIDUALISTIC LEARNING 57-58 {4th ed. 1994).
58.
"Cognition is the process by which knowledge is acquired. It may be based on perception,
intuition, or reason." See TuE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 259 (1970), cited in Conry & Nelson,
supra note 6, at n.27.
59.
Trevino, supra note 3, at 454.
60.
Id.
61.
Id.
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and strategies, and thus consider using the next higher stage of moral deci
sion-making.62
Drawing on this research, I designed my professional responsibility
course to present the ethical issues within the framework of the moral deci
sion-making process. This process is commonly understood to include four
elements: (a) moral sensitivity, (b) moral judgment, (c) moral will, and (d)
moral action. 63
A morally sensitive actor is readily aware of the "moral content" of a
given situation. 64 Moral sensitivity requires consciousness of the conflicting
issues and pressures at play in a given situation. 65 A blueprint of these is
sues, in the context of legal ethics, can be found in the Rules governing at
torney conduct. Thus, a starting point for stimulating students' moral sensi
tivity is a study of the Rules. Because, however, the Rules, read in isola
tion, "lack definition, depth, and applicability," they must be studied "along
with the stories and narratives that illustrate their content, reach, and pur
pose. "66 Accordingly, the theory goes, exposure to cases, hypotheticals,
articles, and firsthand stories describing ethical issues in law practice will
heighten students' moral sensitivity. 67
Once an actor has identified the moral content in a given situation, she
must then exercise moral judgment. Moral judgment is defined as "the se
lection of a standard of judgment, or framework of analysis, and its applica
tion to a situation to identify morally appropriate action."68
My Professional Responsibility course design was fundamentally fo
cused upon students' development of moral judgment. The framework I
introduced, although not explicitly,69 was based on psychologist Lawrence
Kohlberg's paradigm of moral development. 70 According to Kohlberg's
theory, actors' progressions though each stage are both cumulative and se
quential, with the actors engaging in a higher level of moral decision
making in each successive stage. 71 While moral decisions at Level I are
motivated by a desire to conform to a rule's dictates in order to avoid pun
ishment, Levels II through VI increasingly embrace a broader spectrum of
62.
Id. 'These strategies have been tested and supported with children as well as adults in dental,
medical, and business education senings." Id.
63.
Conry & Nelson, supra note 6, at 7-8.
64.
Id. at 7.
See id.
65.
66.
Cramton & Koniak, supra note 3, at 176. "Stories transform the monolithic uniformity of the
ethics rules-pretending, in effect, that every lawyer ... has the same duties and responsibilities-into a
much more variegated and discriminating landscape." Id. at 177.
67.
Id. at 176-77.
68.
Conry & Nelson, supra note 6, at 7.
69.
I did not identify to my class that the pedagogical framework was based upon a moral
development theory, nor did I attribute the theory of stage development to Kohlberg. I simply asked the
same questions in every class, thus guiding the students' discussion through the stages.
70.
KOHLBERG ET AL., supra note 16. "Lawrence Kohlberg's stage theory of moral reasoning has
been recognized as the major cognitive-structural perspective on moral development." Id. at vii.
71.
See Conry & Nelson, supra note 6, at 37-39 (describing the six stages of moral development,
including each stage's general characteristics and prototypical views).
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concerns. 72 For example, decisions made at Level II are motivated by the
dictates of rules as well as by concerns for the actor's self-interest. 73 Deci
sions made at Level III are deemed moral if they further reflect "a concern
for the approval of others."74 Decisions at Level IV add the additional con
cern of the avoidance of chaos and the maintenance of law and order. 75
Level V decisions reflect a concern with the issues expressed in Levels I-IV
as well as with minority and majority views. 76 Finally, decisions made at
Level VI cumulate the lower level concerns as well as embrace an objective
perspective of the proper societal standard to be applied. 77
I endeavored to guide the class discussion through progressively higher
stages of moral decision-making, introducing an increasingly broader range
of concerns for the students to consider. When they identified a Rule as
dictating the resolution of a dilemma, I asked them why they would follow
the Rule. Was it simply to avoid disciplinary action by the Board of Bar
Overseers, or were there other, more multifaceted, considerations? As the
discussion progressed, the process of resolving conflicting choices became
more complicated and implicated a greater number of interests than the stu
dents originally thought.
When a moral dilemma could not be resolved with reference to a Rule,
the discussion followed a similar path. Moreover, the moral content of the
Rules themselves became subject to stage-analysis. For example, what con
cerns are the confidentiality rules designed to address? What are the rea
sons behind the rule as written; and, are the interests the rule purports to
address fully satisfied? The final stage of analysis arrived at varied by topic
and by class, but the students, in regularly engaging in a deliberate progres
sion, began to independently engage in their analysis with greater sophisti
cation.
VI. CONCLUSION

The ending to my Professional Responsibility story is as yet unwritten:
The extent to which students, in their future careers as lawyers, will exhibit
moral judgment, moral will, and moral action 78 is unknown. 79 I have more
confidence, however, that the students who have, with goodwill and dili
72.
Id.
73.
Id. at 37.
74.
Id. at 38.
75.
Id.
76.
Conry & Nelson, supra note 6, at 38-39.
ld.at39.
77.
78.
Moral judgment is defined as "the selection of a standard of judgment, or framework of analy
sis, and its application to a situation to identify morally appropriate action[.)" Id. at 7. Moral will is
defined as "the resolve to act in conformity with the moral judgment[.]" Id. Moral action is "the im
plementation of the moral judgment." Id. at 7-8.
79.
Some research subsequent to Kohlberg's has discovered a correlation between moral develop
ment and moral action, with the most significant relationship found in a business context. Conry &
Nelson, supra note 6, at 7-8.
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gence, engaged in over twenty-five intense discussions with members of the
bench and bar concerning professional ethical issues, will at least have
greater tools with which to both identify and analyze the ethical issues they
face.
Replicating this course requires a good relationship with the local bar,80
good scheduling skills, the ability to allow class discussions to take unex
pected turns, as well as the skills to bring it back to where it needs to go. It
is also a great forum for someone who has been out of practice for a number
of years to re-engage with the ethical issues currently on the minds of mem
bers of the bench and bar. The conversations we engaged in were as inter
esting and inspiring as I hoped. I plan to ask many of my current students
back as guest participants, after they begin their practices, to continue the
conversation with the next generation of law students.

80.
In three semesters of teaching this course in this format, I called upon over 60 members of the
local bar to participate in the class. Some lawyers traveled as far as fifty miles to attend the class. The
vast majority of the guests expressed gratitude for the invitation to participate and asked me to invite
them again.

